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1introduction
‘Come, let us go down and confuse their language, so that they will not understand 
one another’s speech’ 1
‘A certain degree of international unifi cation of law is necessary to put an end 
to the chaotic situation in which international legal relations are found today. … 
Lawyers must be awakened to the conscience of the new world and must be instilled 
with an international spirit which has lain dormant during a century of retreat of 
national law. In this lies a task of comparative law. The road will sometimes be 
hard.’2
1 Genesis 11:7 
2 R. David, ‘The Methods of Unifi cation’, American Journal of Comparative Law (1968), 13-27, 
at 27.
2 chapter 1
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This book deals with judicial jurisdiction of state courts in international disputes, 
in particular those arising out of transnational commercial contracts entered into 
between private entities, individuals, and corporations.1 The present study exam-
ines whether any common grounds in jurisdiction rules exist and, as the case may 
be, whether a uniform global jurisdictional system for international contractual 
disputes is achievable. The question of jurisdiction of state courts to adjudicate 
transnational commercial disputes becomes relevant when a contract or dispute has 
an international dimension, for example because the parties are located in different 
countries, such as a sales contract with an Australian seller and a Dutch buyer, or 
because the contract calls for performance outside the states of the parties’ seats. 
For a proper understanding of the relevance of jurisdiction in international court 
litigation, the following introductory remarks will put this study into the context of 
international commercial litigation.
1.1 International Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation
Cultural, social, and commercial exchanges between private individuals or corpo-
rations from different corners of the globe are intensifying. As businesses continue 
to carry out activities across international borders, the number of international 
commercial relationships is growing. Inevitably, this also leads to international 
legal disputes in civil and commercial matters. The traditional method to settle 
international disputes is by litigating in national courts. One of the fi rst questions 
raised in international court litigation is: which court has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the dispute? Although this jurisdictional question appears logical and simple, the 
answer is far from simple. In times of the so-called ‘globalization of the law’,2 the 
regulation of international jurisdiction of state courts has, remarkably, not kept up 
1 Jurisdiction to adjudicate should be distinguished from jurisdiction to prescribe (legislative pow-
er) and jurisdiction to enforce (executive power). 
2 See Hatzimihail and Nuyts, talking about ‘legal globalization’, N. Hatzimihail and A. Nuyts, ‘Ju-
dicial Cooperation between the United States and Europe in Civil and Commercial Matters: An Over-
view of Issues’, in International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (2005), 
1-25, at 7. See on the issue in general, E.  Loquin and C. Kessedjian, eds., La mondialisation du droit 
(2000); P. Berman, ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’, 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
(2002), 311-545; A. Johnston and E. Powles, ‘The Kings of the World and Their Dukes’ Dilemma: 
Globalisation, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law’, in Globalisation and Jurisdiction (2004), 13-54, 
at 14-20; H. van Loon, ‘Globalisation and The Hague Conference on Private International Law’, 2 
International Law FORUM du droit international (2000), 230-234; and see on the Americanisation 
of the law, H. Muir Watt, ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’, Revue internationale de droit 
comparé (2000), 503-527, referring to B. Audit, L’americanisation du droit (2001), and P. Wautelet, 
‘What Has International Private Law Achieved in Meeting the Challenges Posed by Globalisation?’, 
in Globalisation and Jurisdiction (2004), 55-77, at 56.
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with the legal consequences of the increasing number of international disputes. The 
regulation of ‘traditional’ adjudication by state courts over international disputes is 
still national law-based.3 Apart from the few successful regional uniform regula-
tions of international jurisdiction,4 individual states determine the scope of their 
judicial powers according to their own rules of jurisdiction. States have different 
approaches in regulating international jurisdiction. Many of these differences are 
usually explained by the more general differences between the legal traditions of 
common law versus civil law. One of the principal differences is that courts of An-
glo-American tradition have considerable discretion in determining their compe-
tence over an international dispute, whereas Continental European countries have 
limited or closed sets of jurisdiction rules leaving the courts with little discretion.
As a result, the identifi cation of the competent court – or courts – in interna-
tional litigation becomes quite a complex and diffi cult task for the parties involved. 
An international litigator searching for judicial relief through state courts will of-
ten fi nd himself stuck in a web of national jurisdiction rules or in a ‘jurisdictional 
jungle’.5 For the parties involved, this may lead to jurisdictional uncertainty in 
international legal relationships and disputes. 
1.1.1 The Relevance of International Jurisdiction 
The complexity of determining the competent court in such a ‘jurisdictional web’ 
is all the more striking in view of the importance of the jurisdictional question. 
First and foremost, the competent court will, according to its own confl ict of law 
rules, determine the law applicable to the case, or apply the lex fori.6 The outcome 
of a dispute is therefore strongly dependent on which court has jurisdiction over 
the case. Differences in procedural law, varying from one forum to another, also 
infl uence the course and outcome of international court litigation.7 Finally, once 
3 In most legal orders, the question of international jurisdiction traditionally belongs to the disci-
pline of private international law or confl ict of laws. Contrary to what its name suggests, the discipline 
of private international law originates from national law: according to Juenger ‘neither its rules nor 
the rules to which they refer, are of an international or supranational nature’, F. Juenger, ‘The Problem 
with Private International Law’, in Private Law in the International Arena: From National Confl ict 
Rules towards Harmonization and Unifi cation: Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (2000), 289-309, at 290. 
However, the more unifi ed the rules of private international law, the more ‘international’ or ‘suprana-
tional’ the discipline will become. See P. de Vareilles-Sommières, La compétence internationale de 
l’état en matière de droit privé: Droit international public et droit international privé (1997), at 224. 
See A. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: Essays in Private Inter-
national Law (1996), at 2-3. The jurisdictional question is considered by Brand to be the ‘jurisdictional 
subpart of private international law’, see R. Brand, ‘Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in 
Private International Law’, 25 University of Pittsburg School of Law Working Paper Series (2005), 
at 4.
4 See below, Sect. 1.3.1.
5 By analogy to M. Reimann, Confl icts of Law in Western Europe: A Guide through the Jungle 
(1995). 
6 Except in cases where the parties have agreed upon the applicable law by way of a choice of law 
agreement. 
7 These procedural divergences include, among others, the existence of trial jury, procedural de-
lays, the possibility of judicial review, judicial costs, and the existence of contingency fees. See below 
under Sect. 1.1.2 on forum shopping.
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the court has rendered judgement, the underlying jurisdictional foundation of the 
court’s judgement plays a signifi cant role when its recognition and enforcement is 
sought in another country by one of the parties. If the court of origin based its juris-
diction on excessive grounds – in the sense that jurisdiction is founded on a (very) 
weak link between the dispute and the forum – the recognition and enforcement of 
the judgement by another state may be problematic.
Apart from these legal consequences illustrating the relevance of the jurisdic-
tional question, there are other more practical aspects to the question of interna-
tional jurisdiction. Litigating in a foreign court often involves language barriers, 
paying additional travel expenses and fi nding local legal counsel. The importance 
of jurisdiction in international litigation and its effect on the merits of a case make 
it worthwhile ‘litigating on where to litigate’.8 The competence of national courts 
is therefore often fi ercely argued. Such ‘judicial battles’ involve a lot of energy, 
time and procedural costs, sometimes at the expense of the merits of the case, if 
resources are exhausted by the jurisdictional battle.
1.1.2 Forum Selection and Forum Shopping 
International court litigation is characterized by the fact that, as a rule and apart 
from situations where parties validly agreed on a dispute settlement clause, it is 
the plaintiff who chooses one forum over another by simply instituting proceed-
ings. Several courts can be available to the plaintiff to commence proceedings, 
either because more than one jurisdictional regime asserts jurisdiction over the 
same case,9 or because a unifi ed jurisdictional regime provides for alternative ju-
risdiction rules.10 A well-advised claimant will logically institute proceedings at 
the most favourable forum, thus improving its chances of success.11 The result is a 
race to the court, since the party who institutes proceedings fi rst, gets to select its 
preferred forum.12 Forum selection by the claimant for the most favourable forum 
is called forum shopping.13 Traditionally the lack of unifi cation – or ‘decisional 
 8 See also W. O’Brian Jr., ‘The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: The Way For-
ward’, 66 The Modern Law Review (2003), 491-509, at 597; A. von Mehren, ‘Theory and Practice of 
Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies 
and Practices of Common- and Civil-Law Systems: General Course on Private International Law 
(1996)’, 295 Recueil des cours (2003), 9-431, at 195-196; L. Silberman, ‘Developments in Jurisdic-
tion and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a 
Uniform Standard’, 28 Texas International Law Journal (1993), 501-529, at 502; and A. Bell, Forum 
Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (2003), § 1.32 et seq., at 15.
 9 Also known as positive jurisdiction confl icts see below Sect. 1.2.1.
10 This will be demonstrated in Chapter 2 which covers unifi cation in Europe. See also A. Briggs, 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (2005), § 2.10, at 34, on the need to be the fi rst to commence pro-
ceedings.
11 See R. Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozeβrecht (2005), § 1096, at 373, stating that it is a law-
yer’s duty to advise his client on the most favourable forum with the best chances of success. 
12 In the words of Geimer ‘Entscheidend wäre die Parteirolle’, Geimer, Internationales 
Zivilprozeβrecht, § 1101, at 375.
13 See for other defi nitions ‘Forum Shopping Reconsidered’, 103 Harvard Law Review (1990), 
1677-1696, at 1677 et seq. (editorial article). See also the House of Lords in The Atlantic Star, [1974] 
AC 436, at 442.
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harmony’14 – in confl ict of law rules is considered to be the main incentive for 
forum shopping. A plaintiff will carefully weigh the differences in confl ict of law 
rules determining the applicable law and will choose a forum applying the most 
favourable substantive law.15 It has rightfully been argued that unifi cation of con-
fl ict of law rules, or of substantive law for that matter, would not prevent forum 
shopping.16 By selecting the forum, the claimant will also consider the availability 
of high damages awarded by the available forums, the level of procedural costs 
and cost liabilities, the existence of a jury trial and pre-trial discovery, potential 
delays for rendering judgements and the availability of contingency fees.17 For 
example, U.S. courts are often considered to be attractive to foreign tort victims, 
as U.S. courts are said to award higher (punitive) damages and include generous 
trial juries.18 Along with the language, cultural differences and other practical con-
siderations mentioned above, alleged differences in the quality and independence 
of the judiciary among world courts also infl uence parties to choose for or avoid a 
particular forum.19
The legitimacy of forum shopping in itself has been debated, as well as whether 
forum shopping should be encouraged by allowing claimants to shop. This debate 
is not only concerned with parties’ interests but also with the effects of forum 
shopping on the workload of some more popular forums, leading to overcrowded 
docks.20 Nonetheless, the fact remains that forum shopping is a natural conse-
14 This refers to the words ‘decisional harmony’ found in the title of Juenger’s article, F. Juenger, 
‘Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and the Elusive Goal of Decisional Harmony’, in Law and Reality: 
Essays on National and International Procedural Law in Honour of Cornelis Carel Albert Voskuil 
(1992), 137-147.
15 See P. Hay, ‘Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law. Refl ections on 
Current European and United States Confl icts Law’, 226 Recueil des cours (1991), 281-412, at 308-
309, explaining and condemning the phenomenon of ‘law shopping’ by means of jurisdiction rules. 
See also A.  Nuyts, ‘Forum Shopping et Abus du Forum Shopping dans l’Espace Judiciaire Européen’, 
3 Global Jurist Advances (2003), at 6; available at: http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol3/iss1/
art2.
16 See in general the article by F. Ferrari, ‘“Forum Shopping” Despite International Contract Law 
Conventions’, 51 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002), 689-708; and H. Schul-
ze, ‘Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in International Litigation: The Leuven/London Principles’, 
25 South African Yearbook of International Law (2000), 161-180, at 164.
17 According to M. Whincop, Policy and Pragmatism in the Confl ict of Laws (2001), at 188, a 
plaintiff looks for ‘minimising litigation costs and award-maximising forum’.
18 See the famous statement by Lord Denning, often cited in the forum shopping debate: ‘As a moth 
is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States’, in Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. 
and Others v. Bloch, [1983] 1 WLR 730 (CA), at 733-734.
19 According to Park, the fear of biased courts also strongly infl uences the plaintiff’s choice for a 
particular forum, see W. Park, ‘The Relative Reliability of Arbitration Agreements and Court Selection 
Clauses’, in International Dispute Regulation (1997), at 6. 
20 Participating in this debate are, among many others, K. Siehr, ‘“Forum shopping” im internatio-
nalen Rechtsverkehr’, 25 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (1984), 124-144, at 133; K. Clermont and 
T. Eisenberg, ‘Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping’, 80 Cornell Law Review (1995), 1507-1535; 
F. Juenger, ‘Forum Shopping Domestic and International’, 63 Tulane Law Review (1989), 553-574; F. 
Juenger, ‘What’s Wrong with Forum Shopping?’, 16 Sydney Law Review (1994), 5-13; B. Opeskin, 
‘The Price of Forum Shopping: A Reply to Professor Juenger’, 16 Sydney Law Review (1994), 14-27; 
J. Kropholler, ‘Das Unbehagen am Forum Shopping’, in Festschrift für Karl Firsching zum 70. Ge-
burtstag (1985), 165-173.
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quence of differences among available fora.21 A more interesting question is asked 
by Juenger, namely, ‘if the forum shoppers are free from blame what about the 
shops?’22 While forum shopping is only possible when more than one court is 
available to the plaintiff, it is more interesting to identify the bases upon which 
courts accept jurisdiction and whether these bases are excessive, or in another term 
‘exorbitant’. Eliminating exorbitant jurisdiction rules and restricting the plaintiff’s 
choice of fora by unifying jurisdiction rules will reduce forum shopping.23
Despite a plaintiff’s natural procedural advantage due to his privilege to se-
lect the forum, defendants are however not always defenceless. ‘Reversed forum 
shopping’ occurs when a proactive defendant seeks an anti-suit injunction or de-
claratory judgement in another court.24 Alternatively, ‘anti-shopping’ devices are 
available in common law jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions a defendant can re-
quest the court to stay proceedings on the basis of the forum (non) conveniens 
doctrine, which in practice results in evaluating the claimant’s choice of forum.25 
1.2 International Litigation and the Principle of Party 
Autonomy
A growing need for effi cient international dispute resolution on the one hand and 
the complexity of international litigation by state courts on the other, led the inter-
national trade community to turn to alternative dispute settlement methods, such as 
arbitration, to settle their international disputes.26 The principle of party autonomy 
implies that parties are not only free to agree on which law will govern their con-
tract, but also on how their disputes will be settled and by whom.27 Today, party 
autonomy plays a fundamental role in international dispute resolution. In fact, the 
question of unifi cation of jurisdiction rules only becomes relevant if the parties 
have not – or have not validly – agreed how and where their disputes will be re-
solved.
21 See the famous statement made in The Atlantic Star, [1974] AC 436, at 471: ‘“Forum-shopping” 
is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, 
he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably presented: this should be 
a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.’
22 F. Juenger, ‘Forum Non Conveniens – Who Needs It?’, in Wege zur Globalisierung des Rechts: 
Festschrift für Rolf A. Schütze zum 65. Geburtstag (1999), 317-336, at 319. According to Juenger 
‘Instead of casting aspersions on forum shoppers, we should applaud them for putting this important 
question into stark relief’, see Juenger, ‘What’s Wrong?’, at 13.
23 See Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue, § 1.19 et seq., at 9. 
24 Ibid., § 4.04, at 135 et seq.; Geimer distinguishes ‘Steuerungsmoglichkeiten en Abwehrstra-
tegien des Beklagten’, see Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozeβrecht, § 1108-1124, at 376-381.
25 See Chapter 4 on ‘England’. See also J. Fawcett, Declining Jurisdiction in Private International 
Law (1995), at 22.
26 See in this sense S. Greenberg, ‘Resolving International Business Disputes’, in Guide to Export-
Import Basics: Vital Knowledge for Trading Internationally (2008), 59-76 and Park, ‘The Relative 
Reliability’, at 4. 
27 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn. (2004) and see Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness, at 
199 et seq.
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1.2.1 Choice of Forum and Forum Fixing
Parties to international court litigation are free to designate a particular court or fo-
rum, by way of a jurisdiction clause – or choice of forum clause – to hear their case 
either exclusively or non-exclusively.28 By fi xing the competent forum in advance, 
parties avoid having to litigate in an unknown or distant forum. Such forum fi xing 
avoids uncertainty and the ‘jurisdictional battle’ described above.29 However, the 
validity of the jurisdiction clause still depends on the requirements arising out of 
the national law of the chosen court. In addition, especially courts from the com-
mon law tradition are allowed to refuse jurisdiction if they consider the chosen 
forum inappropriate for the dispute lying before them.30 Finally, although scarce, 
some national jurisdictional regimes will not give effect at all to an express choice 
of a particular forum. 
Judgements rendered by agreed courts are more likely to be recognised and en-
forced in other countries, because they result from the parties’ consent. At present, 
successful international instruments regulating the validity and effect of a choice 
of forum are lacking in transatlantic business relations.31 The Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements of 30 June 2005, which was drafted by The Hague 
Conference for Private International Law is still in the process of ratifi cation and 
has not yet entered into force. 32 However, this important Convention should, if 
successful, contribute to more certainty around choice of forum clauses and result-
ing judgements.33
1.2.2 The Alternative: The Success of International Arbitration 
The current lack of clarity on the jurisdictional question creates uncertainty. This is 
one reason for the success of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism: inter-
national commercial arbitration.34 International commercial arbitration has taken 
the lead in international litigation as the principal way to settle international dis-
putes.35 Available only where the parties have entered into an arbitration agree-
28 See for an exhaustive overview A. Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
(2008) and see also Park, ‘The Relative Reliability’, at 7, referring to jurisdiction clauses as ‘proroga-
tion agreements’.
29 See Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozeβrecht, § 1125, at 382, and see for other pros and cons of 
forum fi xing, P. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht (2008), at 35-42.
30 According to the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 8.
31 See Sect. 1.3.2, below.
32 See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98. On 19 January 2009, the 
outgoing State Department Legal Advisor, John Bellinger, signed the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements on behalf of the U.S.A. Mexico is the fi rst party to the Convention through acces-
sion on 26 September 2007. Regarding the EU, on 5 September 2008 a Proposal for a Council Deci-
sion on the signing by the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements 
of 2005 was presented, see COM(2008) 538 fi nal.
33 As also discussed by K. Kramer, ‘De forumkeuze als betrouwbaar alternatief voor het arbitraal 
beding in de internationale handelspraktijk? Het nieuwe Haags Forumkeuzeverdrag’, Nederlands Tijd-
schrift voor Handelsrecht (2006), 165-172.
34 P. Sanders, Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice: A Comparative Study 
(1999), at 2.
35 See P. Schlosser, ‘The 1968 Brussels Convention and Arbitration’, 7 Arbitration International 
(1991), 227-242, at 228; P. Schlosser, ‘The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts’, 8 Arbitration 
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ment, this alternative way to settle disputes gives one or more arbitrators – ‘private 
judges’ – the power to resolve the dispute by rendering a binding decision.36 Since 
arbitration is – but for a few exceptions – voluntary and is founded on the parties’ 
consent, the parties waive their traditional right of access to judicial adjudication 
by national courts and entrust the settlement of their disputes to arbitrators to the 
exclusion of court proceedings.37
Apart from the other alleged advantages of arbitration in comparison with court 
litigation, such as speed, confi dentiality, effi ciency and expertise,38 the increasing 
use of international arbitration is unmistakably due to the success of the New York 
Convention of 1958.39 This Convention facilitates the recognition of foreign arbi-
tral awards and most importantly for present purposes, stipulates validity require-
ments for international arbitration agreements.40 The above-mentioned Hague 
Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements could equally increase the use of 
choice of forum clauses and complement the New York Convention.
Another signifi cant advantage of international arbitration over court proceed-
ings is that by its very nature the latter is ‘coloured’ by cultural or political aspects 
of a national legal order, whereas in international arbitration parties agree on the 
procedural rules, including the language of the proceedings and the composition 
of the arbitral tribunal.41 Parties generally do not want to risk court proceedings 
in an unknown or distant court, or even in a suspected biased court.42 Moreover, 
one of the parties will have an advantage over the other or even a ‘home court 
advantage’.43 Only dispute settlement mechanisms, which are based on the con-
International (1992), 189-204, at 190. Another alternative dispute resolution mechanism worth men-
tioning in the present context is ‘expert determination’. See for a more detailed overview of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in international disputes, F. De Ly, ‘Applicable Law and Dis-
pute Resolution Clauses: A Premilinary Report’, in Les grandes clauses des contrats internationaux, 
Brussels Conference, March 11-12, 2005 (2005), 167-234.
36 The arbitration agreement or arbitration clause – a private agreement based on consent of the 
parties to arbitrate – constitutes the very basis for the arbitration process and its arbitral award. 
37 International arbitration, however, still needs the support of the courts, especially for the en-
forcement of arbitral awards. See Sanders, Quo Vadis?, at 19; see also Schlosser, ‘The 1968 Brussels 
Convention and Arbitration’, at 228.
38 Critics challenge the so-called advantages, especially in light of a recent trend of juridicalisa-
tion of international arbitration proceedings. See in general F. Lowenfeld, ‘Book Review: Quo Vadis 
Arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001), 
728-731, and L. Silberman, ‘International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic’, American Review of 
International Arbitration (2002), 9-18.
39 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New 
York on 10 June 1958. See also Sanders, Quo Vadis?, at 9.
40 Art. 2 of the New York Convention requires such an agreement to be in writing and obliges the 
courts of Contracting States to give effect to such an agreement. See also http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
41 Schlosser claims that ‘[l]acking any transnational judiciary, arbitration is an absolute necessity 
in international trade’, see Schlosser, ‘The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts’, at 189. 
42 ‘Arbitration justifi es itself in a cross-border business context principally as a tool to minimize 
the real or imagined dangers of litigation abroad: a mechanism to reduce the risk of ending up before a 
biased foreign judge who will apply unfamiliar procedures in a strange language’, Park, ‘The Relative 
Reliability’, at 4 et seq.
43 See Lowenfeld, The Quest for Reasonableness, at 198.
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sent of parties, have the ability to ‘delocalize’ or ‘denationalize’ transnational dis-
putes.44
International arbitration is however not best suited for every international dis-
pute, especially those arising out of small and medium sized contracts, but the 
complexity of international jurisdiction for court litigation leaves parties with ar-
bitration as the sole option to settle their dispute.45 Parties should be given a real 
choice between state courts and arbitration; a choice that will not exist as long as a 
jurisdictional framework for international court litigation is lacking. 
1.3 Unifi cation of International Jurisdiction Rules
Unifi cation efforts in the fi eld of private international law46 have mainly been fo-
cused on confl ict of law rules, rather than on international jurisdiction rules.47 In 
the fi eld of international commercial matters in general, and contractual disputes 
in particular, little unifi cation of international jurisdiction has been achieved at a 
world-wide level.48 International conventions are considered the principal source 
of the unifi cation of private international law.49 As a rule, they are negotiated and 
drafted by state delegates and based on a political consensus among the participat-
ing states. The principal objection to this method of unifi cation is the lack of fl ex-
ibility to adapt to changes in a dynamic legal world.50
44 See in general, L. De Lima Pinheiro, ‘The “Denationalization” of Transnational Relationships: 
Regulation of Transnational Relationships by Public International Law, European Community Law 
and Transnational Law’, in Aufbruch nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht 
(2001), 429-446, at 429.
45 See in general, R. David, ‘The Methods of Unifi cation’, 16 American Journal of Comparative 
Law (1968), 13-27, at 24.
46 In the international arena, unifi cation also takes place in other fi elds of law, such as in procedural 
law and substantive law. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Vienna 1980 (CISG) is often used to illustrate a successful instrument of uniform substan-
tive law, as it has been ratifi ed by many states and elaborated within the United Nations Commission 
for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) whose ‘business is the modernization and harmonization 
of rules on international business’, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html. Some consider 
different forms of unifi cation to ‘go hand in hand’, see P. Glenn, ‘Unifi cation of Law, Harmonization 
of Law and Private International Law’, in Liber memorialis François Laurent, 1810-1887 (1989), 783- 
793, at 783; others see them as each other’s opposite, see R. David, ‘Unifi cation du droit et arbitrage’, 
in Verhagen Lectures: Erasmus University Faculty of Law, 20 September 1976 (1977), at 6.
47 A. Miaja de la Muela, ‘Les principes directeurs des règles de compétence territoriale des tri-
bunaux internes en matière de litiges comportant un élément international’, 135 Recueil des cours 
(1973), 1-96, at 41-42.
48 Most bilateral agreements in this fi eld aim at recognition and enforcement of each other’s judge-
ments, but are less concerned with international jurisdiction. In this context it is worth mentioning that 
an attempt to elaborate a U.K./U.S. bilateral agreement failed after long negotiations. See in general 
the articles of H. Smit, ‘The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements: A Prototype for the Future’, 17 Virginia Journal of International Law 
(1977), 443-468; and P. Hay and R. Walker, ‘The Proposed U.S.-U.K. Recognition-of-Judgements 
Convention: Another Perspective’, 18 Virginia Journal of International Law (1978), 753-768.
49 See also Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue, § 3.03 et seq., at 50. 
50 See K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998), translated by Tony 
Weir from the German, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, at 
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1.3.1 Regional Unifi cation 
a) Europe
Regional unifi cation of jurisdiction rules has proved most successful in Europe. 
The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements51 
turned out to be a successful regional unifi cation instrument of jurisdiction rules 
in the fi eld of civil and commercial matters.52 Its successor, Council Regulation 
44/2001, is currently in force in all the EU Member States.53 Its provisions have 
been extended to Switzerland, Norway and Iceland by virtue of a ‘parallel’ Lugano 
Convention.54 As a result, judicial powers in the EU and the remaining EFTA states 
are allocated by uniform jurisdiction rules, and judgements are automatically rec-
ognized and enforced according to the same ‘Brussels Model’. As Stephen Cromie 
roughly summarises, ‘The courts of the world are now divided into two categories: 
those whose jurisdiction is decided wholly by their own rules of Private Interna-
tional Law, and those of countries which are parties of the Brussels and/or Lugano 
Conventions.’55
The particularity of this Brussels Model is that it is a ‘double convention’:56 not 
only does the instrument eliminate barriers to the free movement of judgements by 
regulating recognition and enforcement of judgements within the EU and EFTA 
borders, it also contains direct uniform jurisdiction rules allocating judicial pow-
ers among the participating states. The jurisdictional question is therefore directly 
linked to the question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.57 
25: ‘Multilateral treaties are very diffi cult to achieve and rather clumsy in operation.’ See also S. 
Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements: Trans-At-
lantic Law Making for Transnational Litigation (2003), at 68, arguing that transatlantic law-making 
has become a laborious task, especially considering the attitude of some countries towards interna-
tional treaties.
51 The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters of 27 September 1968 was fi rst published in French in OJ 1972 L 299/32 and in English 
in OJ 1978 L 304/36 [hereafter ‘Brussels Convention’]. See Chapter 2, Sect. 2.1. 
52 The Convention entered into force in 1971 between the original six Member States.
53 Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements of Civil and Commer-
cial Matters (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, OJ 2001 L 12. Denmark’s exceptional position 
will be explained in the following chapter.
54 The Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters enacted for the States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
was signed on 16 September 1988, published in OJ 1988 L 319/9. A new Lugano Convention has 
recently been approved to replace the 1988 Lugano Convention in order to align it with the modifi ca-
tions of the Brussels Regulation. The offi cial text of the revised Lugano Convention is published in OJ 
of 21 December 2007 L 339 at 3, which also includes the Council Decision of 15 October 2007 on its 
signing, on behalf of the Community (2007/712/EC), L 339, at 1. See also the Proposal for a Council 
Decision of 29 February 2008 concerning the conclusion of the new Lugano Convention, COM (2008) 
116 fi nal 2008/0048. 
55 S. Cromie and W. Park, International Commercial Litigation (1990), at 3.
56 See Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention, fn. 269, at 55, stating that very few double 
bilateral conventions have been elaborated prior to the Brussels Convention of 1968. 
57 See among others R. Michaels, ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in 
Judgment Conventions’, 123 Duke Law School Legal Studies (2006), at 11-12.
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The Brussels Model consists of a ‘closed’ set of uniform jurisdiction rules which 
replaces national jurisdiction rules. 
b) Latin America
Apart from this ‘pan-European’ unifi cation, other regional unifi cation efforts are to 
be found in Latin America.58 The Latin American States are pioneers of the region-
al unifi cation of private international law. Latin American unifi cation is twofold: 
the fi rst private international law treaties, known under the Montevideo Treaties 
and revised in 1939-1940, were adopted in 188959 and in 1928 a comprehensive 
code for private international law, the Bustamante Code, was approved in Havana 
at the Sixth Conference of American States.60 Both instruments already included 
provisions dealing with international jurisdiction, even though the main body of 
the Treaties and Code consists of confl ict of law rules.61 
After the OAS was established, its Inter-American Juridical Committee62 re-
sumed efforts to unify private international law and attempted to merge the Bus-
tamante Code and the Montevideo Treaties in light of the U.S. Restatements of 
Confl ict of Laws, but without much success.63 Currently unifi cation of private in-
58 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose purpose is to promote regional peace 
and stability in Southeast Asia through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law, is limited to legal 
cooperation. See also Van Loon, ‘Globalisation and The Hague Conference’, at 233; R. Graveson, 
‘Private International Law: A Century of Unifi cation’, in Liber memorialis François Laurent, 1810-
1887 (1989), 795-804, at 797; and http://www.aseansec.org.
59 These treaties were the result of several South American Governments working on unifi cation 
and codifi cation of private international law by holding the fi rst Congress of Private International Law 
in Montevideo. See A. Garro, Armonización y unifi cación del derecho privado en América Latina: Es-
fuerzos, tendencias y realidades (1992), at 10-13; A. Villela, ‘L’unifi cation du droit international privé 
en Amérique latine’, 73 Revue critique de droit international privé (1984), 233-265, at 245.
60 The fi rst International Conference of American States began in 1889, long after Simón Bolívar 
expressed his idea of unifi cation of law within the region in 1826. In 1948, the Organisation of Ameri-
can States (OAS) was created. See J. Siqueiros, ‘La Conferencia de La Haya y las Convenciones 
Interamericanas de Derecho Internacional Privado’, in Liber Amicorum Homenaje a la Obra Cientí-
fi ca y Académica de la Profesora Tatiana B. de Maekelt (2001), at 84; and Villela, ‘L’unifi cation en 
Amérique latine’, at 235-239. The Bustamante Code was the result of the work of an International 
Commission of American Jurists in 1912. See OAS General Secretariat, ‘Comparative Study of the 
Bustamante Code, The Montevideo Treaties and the Restatement of the Law of Confl ict of Laws’ 
(Washington D.C.: Inter-American Juridical Commitee OAS, 1964), at 6; Garro, Armonización y uni-
fi cación en América Latina, at 13. See for an extensive historical overview of the Bustamente Code, 
J. Samtleben, Internationales Privatrecht in Lateinamerika: Der Código Bustamante in Theorie und 
Praxis (1979). The Code was ratifi ed by many Latin American States. According to Caffrey, the U.S. 
never ratifi ed the Code, claiming that they were unable to grant its approval ‘due to constitutional 
grounds’, see B. Caffrey, International Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in the LAWASIA Region (1985), at 14.
61 For international jurisdiction provisions, see Arts. 314-339 of the Bustamante Code and Arts. 
72-73 and 77-93 of the Montevideo Treaties.
62 The permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists created at the Third Interna-
tional Conference in 1906, http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=06-0067. See General 
Secretariat, ‘Comparative Study’, at 3; Siqueiros, ‘Convenciones Interamericanas’, at 86.
63 See General Secretariat, ‘Comparative Study’, at 3; and K. Nadelmann, ‘The Need for Revision 
of the Bustamante Code on Private International Law’, 65 American Journal of International Law 
(1971), 782-793, at 783. See http://www.oas.org/dil/PrivateIntLaw-HistDevPriLaw-Eng.htm. The 
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ternational law is in the hands of the Specialized Conferences on Private Interna-
tional Law (CIDIP),64 whose works have been ‘modest and realistic’65 and limited 
to rules of applicable law and international judicial cooperation in very specifi c 
areas.66 International jurisdiction has scarcely been touched.67
When the Southern Common Market – or Mercado Común del Sur (MERCO-
SUR) – was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción to promote economic inte-
gration by means of free trade and free movement of goods, peoples, and currency, 
the MERCOSUR Countries68 also committed themselves to reconcile their legisla-
tions in pertinent areas in order to reinforce the integration process.69 It is in this 
context that unifi cation efforts made by MERCOSUR are sometimes referred to as 
the ‘subregional’ unifi cation of private international law.70 Three years after it was 
founded, one of the decisions of the Council of the Common Market involved the 
regulation of international jurisdiction in contractual matters in the Buenos Aires 
Protocol, underlining ‘the importance of adopting common rules on international 
jurisdiction in contractual matters, for the purpose of promoting the development 
of economic relations among the State Parties’ private sectors’ and stating that in 
the area of international business ‘contracting is the legal format of the commerce 
that takes place in connection with the integration process’.71 The 1992 Protocol of 
Inter-American Council of Jurists ceased to exist in 1970, see Siqueiros, ‘Convenciones Interameri-
canas’, at 87. 
64 According to the OAS’s Charter, Specialized Conferences ‘deal with special technical matters 
or … develop specifi c aspects of inter-American cooperation’, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/
PrivateIntLaw-HistDevPriLaw-Eng.htm.
65 Garro, Armonización y unifi cación en América Latina, at 6.
66 Villela, ‘L’unifi cation en Amérique latine’, at 247-256; G. Lucas Sosa, El Derecho Interna-
cional Privado Interamericano y Derecho de Integración (CIDIP V Mexico 1994) (1996), at 26-29; 
Siqueiros, ‘Convenciones Interamericanas’, at 88-91.
67 In 1984, CIDIP-III adopted international instruments on international civil law and international 
procedural law and these include the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International 
Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments. The text is to be found in 56 RabelZ 
(1992), at 149-152. The Convention is not yet in force and focuses primarily on international recogni-
tion. Issues of international jurisdiction are programmed for the CIDIP VII (resolution AG/RES 2065 
(XXXV-0/05), at http://www.oas.org/dil/CIDIP-VII_res.2065.htm).
68 MERCOSUR is a regional trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
recently Venezuela. The Treaty of Asunción was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of 
Ouro Preto. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru currently have an associate member status.
69 Art. 1 of the Treaty of Asunción.
70 D. Fernández Arroyo, Derecho Internacional Privado Interamericano: Evolución y Perspec-
tivas (2000), at 72.
71 See the Preamble of MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. Nº 01/94; Buenos Aires Protocol on Interna-
tional Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/
AN0194_e.asp. Such protocols are similar to international conventions, which require ratifi cation by 
each state individually. See on its legal effects, J. Samtleben, ‘Der MERCOSUR als Rechtssystem’, in 
Wirtschaftsrecht des MERCOSUR – Horizont 2000: Tagung im Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
und internationales Privatrecht am 21.-22. Januar 2000 (2001), 52-94, at 53 and fn. 10, who indicates 
that Uruguay has not yet ratifi ed this jurisdiction protocol. See also J. Vervaele, ‘Mercosur and Re-
gional Integration in South America’, 54 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), 
387-410, at 392 et seq.
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Las Leñas deals with mutual recognition of judgements and appears to be clearly 
inspired by the 1968 Brussels Convention.72
1.3.2 Failed Efforts of Universal Unifi cation: The Hague Project
By far the most important institution for the unifi cation of private international 
law at a global level is the intergovernmental organization of The Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law (HCCH).73 Its purpose is to work for the 
progressive unifi cation of the rules of private international law74 and to ‘work for 
a world in which persons – as well as companies – can enjoy a high degree of 
legal security’.75 Apart from conventions in family matters, the HCCH adopted 
three conventions directly and indirectly dealing with international jurisdiction in 
commercial disputes.76 These conventions are ‘simple’ conventions, meaning that 
they principally deal with international recognition and enforcement of judgements 
and that the jurisdictional question is only dealt with indirectly by way of a juris-
dictional requirement.77 These conventions, however, are of very little practical 
relevance as one entered into force for three countries only.78 The most recent-
ly concluded convention is the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court 
Agreements, whose potential importance has been explained above. This Choice 
of Court Convention is the abridged result of a much wider project covering many 
specifi c issues of international jurisdiction and which started in 1993 as the ‘Hague 
Project on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement in Civil and Commercial 
Matters’. In 1992, the U.S. Department of State proposed to Georges Droz, Secre-
72 According to Vervaele, ‘Mercosur and Regional Integration’, at 401. See MERCOSUR/CMC/
DEC. Nº 05/92; see also MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. Nº 10/96 on International jurisdiction in matters 
relating to consumers.
73 As suggested by T.M.C. Asser and at the initiative of the Dutch Government, the HCCH began 
to organize ad hoc ‘conferences’. The fi rst was held in 1893. At its seventh conference in 1955, the 
HCCH became a permanent international organization. See H. van Loon, ‘Quelques réfl exions sur 
l’unifi cation progressive du droit international privé dans le cadre de la Conférence de La Haye’, in 
Liber memorialis François Laurent, 1810-1887 (1989), 1133-1150, at 1133.
74 Statute of the HCCH of 15 July 1955 (including amendments adopted, approved and entered 
into force on 1 January 2007). See Van Loon, ‘Quelques réfl exions’, at 1142 and Graveson, ‘A Century 
of Unifi cation’, at 798.
75 At http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26.
76 The Convention of 15 April 1958 on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of In-
ternational Sales of Goods, not in force, but signed by Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece. The 
Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice of Court, not yet in force, only signed by Israel; and 
the Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters with its Supplementary Protocol, both entered into force on 20 August 
1979, but are only ratifi ed by Cyprus, The Netherlands and Portugal.
77 The additional Protocol to the 1971 Hague Convention includes, however, a list of exorbitant 
jurisdiction grounds allowing Contracting States to not recognize a judgement if it is based on one 
of these jurisdiction grounds. See for more defi nitions Michaels, ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional 
Conceptions’, at 11.
78 As noted by the HCCH ‘even if the Conventions have not been ratifi ed, they have an infl uence 
upon legal systems, in both Member and non-Member States. They also form a source of inspira-
tion for efforts to unify private international law at the regional level.’ At http://www.hcch.net/in-
dex_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26.
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tary General of the HCCH, to prepare a convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgements.79 From the U.S.’s perspective, the regional unifi cation of the 
Brussels Model was disfavouring U.S. domiciled defendants: although the use of 
national exorbitant jurisdiction rules against defendants domiciled in Europe was 
prohibited, they could still be used against defendants domiciled outside the ter-
ritory. Furthermore, judgements based upon these exorbitant jurisdiction grounds 
could be recognized and enforced in every other participating Member State.80 In 
contrast, foreign judgements seem to be easily recognized in the U.S. on the basis 
of the Foreign Money Act.
At the Seventeenth Session of the HCCH in May 1993, it was decided to in-
clude on the agenda the work in the fi eld of ‘recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgements in commercial and civil matters’. While considering the nature 
of a possible world-wide convention, the Working Group compared the double 
convention of the Brussels Model and the simple convention of the 1971 Hague 
Convention. The Working Group proposed a convention of a mixed type, as sug-
gested by the American scholar Arthur von Mehren.81 Such a ‘mixed convention’ 
would, like a double convention, include uniform rules for direct jurisdiction and 
rules for recognition and enforcement of judgements. However, as opposed to a 
double convention the jurisdiction rules would be divided in three groups:82
• Permitted jurisdiction rules on a white list: judgements obtained on the basis of 
such a white jurisdiction ground are required to be recognized and enforced by 
other states.
• Prohibited jurisdiction rules on a black list: judgements based on these jurisdic-
tion grounds are to be refused recognition and enforcement by other states.
• All other national, not uniform, jurisdiction rules belonged to a grey list: en-
forcement and recognition of these judgements would be left to the law of the 
enforcing state.
79 According to Adler a letter was sent on 5 May 1992 by the former Legal Advisor of the U.S. 
Department of State, Edwin D. Williamson, to Georges Droz, see M. Adler, ‘If We Build It, Will They 
Come? – The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Mon-
etary Judgements’, Law & Policy in International Business (1994), 79-111, fn. 5, referring to a U.S. 
Department of State, Fact Sheet of February 1993.
80 See Chapter 2, Sect. 2.2, for the mechanism and structure of this Brussels Model. On this point 
see the famous and critical articles by K. Nadelmann, ‘Jurisdictional Improper Fora in the Treaties of 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements: The Common  Market Draft’, 67 Columbia Law Review 
(1967), 995-998, answered by L. de Winter, ‘Excessives Jurisdiction in Private International Law’, 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1968), 706-720; F. Juenger, ‘La Convention de 
Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 et la courtoisie internationale: Réfl exions d’un américain’, Revue 
critique de droit international privé (1983), 37-51, and K. Russell, ‘Exorbitant Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgements: The Brussels System as an Impetus for United States Action’, 19 Syracuse 
Journal of International Law & Commerce (1993), 57-92.
81 Adler, ‘The Need for a Multilateral Convention’, fn. 99, refers to the suggestion of Arthur von 
Mehren for a mixed convention in a Final Report to the U.S. Department of State, ‘Recognition Con-
vention Study’ (1992).
82 See Prel. Doc. No. 1 of May 1994 – Annotated checklist of issues to be discussed at the meet-
ing of the Special Commission of June 1994 (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, 1994), at 6-8.
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On 30 October 1999, the Special Commission, consisting of experts, adopted a 
preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. An extensive and clear Report drawn up by Peter Nygh and 
Fausto Pocar accompanied the draft and explained the compromises made. How-
ever, what was supposed to be a closing diplomatic conference in June 2001, with 
the adoption of the draft transforming it into an approved convention, turned into a 
‘complete disaster’.83 The 1999 draft, which was based on consensus, turned into 
a ‘bracketed’ text in which any compromise reached was questioned and therefore 
withdrawn. After having established that consensus was lacking for a wide range 
convention, state delegations discussed the possibility of a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
rather than the ‘top-down’ approach previously taken by the HCCH. In April 2002, 
the Commission I of General Affairs and Policy of the HCCH identifi ed a list of 
hard-core issues upon which negotiations should be continued, covering choice of 
court clauses, defendant’s domicile, submissions, branches, trusts, physical torts 
and counter-claims.84 Nonetheless, the drafts became dead letters. Finally it was 
decided to downscale the project to cover only choice of court agreements. This 
approach proved more successful. The fact that this ambitious world-wide project 
resulted in failure, illustrates the complexity of international unifi cation of jurisdic-
tion law. Yet, time, energy, costs and above all the efforts made by state delegates 
and experts to achieve a mutual understanding of one another’s systems should not 
be thrown away; and ‘throwing the baby and its bathwater’ should be avoided.85 
The failure of The Hague negotiations should not be a permanent disappointment. 
1.3.3 Other Instruments of Unifi cation
Another important legislative method of unifi cation86 is the elaboration of instru-
ments principally drafted by experts in the fi eld rather than by state delegates.87 In 
contrast to international conventions, these instruments are not legally binding, but 
should be considered as ‘recommendations’ for national legislators.88 The follow-
83 D. Bennet, ‘The Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – A 
Failure of Characterisation’, in Intercontinental Cooperation through Private International Law: Es-
says in Memory of Peter E. Nygh (2004), 19-25, at 20.
84 Result of the meetings of 24th of April 2002, Minutes No. 5 (morning session).
85 Brand, The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: Proceedings 
of the Round Table (2005), at 77; P. Nygh, ‘Declining Jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation 
2001 and the Preliminary Draft Hague Judgments Convention: A Comparison’, in Reform and Devel-
opment of Private International Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (2002), 303-334, at 308.
86 Not to be confused with non-legislative means of, or ‘spontaneous’ unifi cation of, law at the 
international level, which occurs through unifi cation in practice, see B. Trompenaars, Pluriforme Uni-
fi catie en Uniforme Interpretatie (1989), at 13; J. Sauveplanne, ‘Eenvormig Privaatrecht’, Themis 
(1961), 225-280, at 240-241; F. De Ly, Europese Gemeenschap en privaatrecht: Uitwerking van inau-
gurele rede Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (1993), at 30.
87 See in general, K. Nadelmann, ‘The International Unifi cation of Law: Uniform Legislation ver-
sus International Conventions Revisited’, 16 American Journal of Comparative Law (1968), 28-50, 
David, ‘The Methods of Unifi cation’, at 19-21; and J. Sauveplanne’s contribution, in D. Kokkini-
Iatridou, Een inleiding tot het rechtsvergelĳkende onderzoek (1988), at 52; and G. Parra Aranguren, 
Curso General de Derecho Internacional Privado: Problemas Selectos y Otros Estudios (1998), at 71.
88 According to Zweigert the method of a model law is less heavy-handed and is rather a matter of 
recommendation than of obligation, see Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 25. 
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ing international non-governmental organizations drafted recommendations and 
general principles dealing with international jurisdiction. The International Law 
Association (ILA), founded in 1873 in Brussels, is (the most) widespread non-
governmental organization with numerous branches world-wide, consisting of 
academics and practicing professionals whose main objective is ‘the study, clari-
fi cation and development’ of public and private international law.89 With respect 
to international jurisdiction in commercial matters, the most signifi cant committee 
is the now defunct ‘Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation’. 
Its work resulted in Resolution No. 1/2000, also known as the Leuven/London 
Principles on declining and referring jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
and in Resolution 4/2002 regarding the Paris/New Delhi Principles on Jurisdiction 
over Corporations.
Also in 1873, in Ghent, a group of eleven international lawyers, among whom 
P. Mancini and T.M.C. Asser, created the Institute of International Law or ‘Institut 
de Droit International’ (IDI) to contribute to and to promote the development of 
international law.90 In 2003 its ‘Second Commission’ adopted the ‘Bruges Resolu-
tion’ on ‘the principles for determining when the use of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and anti-suit injunctions is appropriate’.
Although the Rome-based organization UNIDROIT91 principally focuses on 
the unifi cation of substantive law, in 2004 it adopted, together with the American 
Law Institute (ALI),92 the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure. These rules 
are meant to serve as ‘guidelines for code projects in countries without long pro-
cedural traditions’ and ‘initiate law reforms even in countries with long and high 
quality procedural traditions’. They are to be applied ‘by analogy in international 
commercial arbitration’.93 Principle 2 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Trans-
national Civil Procedure deals with ‘Jurisdiction over Parties’.
89 See http://www.ila-hq.org. The ILA has a consultative status with a number of the United Na-
tions’ Specialized Agencies.
90 See Art. 1(2) of its Statute, at http://www.idi-iil.org. The IDI received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1904 in recognition of its action in favour of arbitration among states as a peaceful means of settling 
disputes.
91 The International Institute for Unifi cation of Private Law, at http://www.unidroit.org.
92 The ALI, founded in 1923, addresses the uncertainty of law in the U.S. by developing Restate-
ments of the Law. In the light of The Hague negotiations on a Worldwide Jurisdiction Convention and 
encouraged by State Department offi cials present at The Hague, the ALI started a project that would 
meet the needs of U.S. law on jurisdiction issues even if The Hague Negotiations would not result 
in an international convention. See A. Lowenfeld and L. Silberman, International Jurisdiction and 
Judgements Project (2000), at 18-30; on the jurisdiction aspects, see A. Lowenfeld and L. Silberman, 
eds., The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: Records of the Conference Held at New 
York University School of Law on the Proposed Convention (2001), at B-1-2 and see B-4. 
93 See Jr. Hazard, M. Taruffo et al., ALI/Unidroit Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil 
Procedure (2003). Multiple references are to be found in 6(4) Uniform Law Review (2001), 739-925, 
which is dedicated to this particular project of the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, with 
contributions from among others, H. Kronke, M. Storme, Ph. Fouchard, J. Walker, A. Gidi, and Th. 
Pfeiffer.
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1.3.4 Desirability of Unifi cation at an International Level
The ‘driving force’ behind the success of regional unifi cation in Europe, and to 
a lesser extent in Latin America, clearly originates from a desire for economic 
and political integration. Although the opening of the First Preliminary Document 
of The Hague Judgment Project refers to a general process of liberalisation of 
the world economy, reasons for unifi cation of jurisdiction rules at an international 
level differ and should therefore be placed in a different context.94 The desirability 
for unifi cation of jurisdiction rules at a world-wide level should be understood as 
a need for an international legal framework regulating cross-border commercial 
activities and its disputes in a ‘globalizing world’, rather than a process that forms 
part of an economic and a political integration.95 Several scholars have argued that 
such a legal framework does not necessarily involve the unifi cation of international 
jurisdiction. Instead they favour the approach of a simple convention whose pri-
mary aim is to guarantee international recognition and enforcement of judgements 
world-wide and which merely includes indirect jurisdiction grounds as jurisdic-
tional requirements.96 In their view, when economic and political reasons for uni-
fi cation are lacking, there is no need for unifi ed jurisdiction rules, a framework for 
world-wide recognition and enforcement of judgements would suffi ce.97 A more 
general malaise in the unifi cation movement strengthens this view.98 The ideology, 
or as Pierre Mayer calls it, ‘the metaphysical interest’ behind international unifi ca-
tion of the law of the beginning of the 20th century has become unpopular.99
94 Prel. Doc. No. 1 of May 1994: Checklist Special Commission, at 4, places international jurisdic-
tion in the context of present times in which ‘the various economic regions in the world are becoming 
more interdependent every day – a process that will be further enforced by the creation of the World 
Trade Organization’. See also M. Reimann, ‘Parochialism in American Confl icts Law’, 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law (2001), 369-389, at 387.
95 See the statement of M. Kovar (U.S. Delegation) at the meeting of Monday, 22 April 2002, 
Morning Session: (United States) Commission I, General Affairs and Policy The Hague Conference. 
Kovar noted in Minutes (No. 1), at 7, that the ‘original attempt to draft a double convention was per-
haps a mistake as not all nations viewed the process from the point of view of economic and political 
integration. Rather, it should be seen as an international method for creating a civil law framework to 
enhance international trade and commerce.’ See also his answer to Professor Beaumont in J. Kovar, 
‘The United States as an Actor in Private International Law’, in Private Law, Private International 
Law, & Judicial Cooperation in the EU-US Relationship (2005), 153-159, at 154.
96 See in particular comments by Pierre Mayer in Proceedings of a Round Table, at 93 and 98. 
97 Kovar, ‘The United States as an Actor’, at 158, refers to unifi cation projects in the fi eld of 
maintenance.
98 The unifi cation movement appears to be ‘in crisis’, see B. Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Comparative 
Law and Confl ict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New Perspectives on an Old Couple’, 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law (2001), 407-427, at 415; see also Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, 
at 27.
99 According to Pierre Mayer this metaphysical interest or this romantic idea behind unifi cation of 
international jurisdiction rules ‘which is associated with the spectacle of uniformity: in this globalised 
world, let us harmonise our rules, let us have uniform grounds of jurisdiction’ is misplaced. He does 
not understand this desire outside a political union and does not think that ‘uniformity is, in itself desir-
able, or that it serves any useful purpose; on the contrary, trying to achieve uniformity brings with it 
serious drawbacks’, in Proceedings of a Round Table, at 95.
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Why then is the unifi cation of international jurisdiction rules desirable? As a 
general rule, unifi cation of law is still considered to be desirable if it meets the 
‘specifi c needs of international legal business’.100 In that respect it is undeniable 
that the desirability of unifi cation of jurisdiction lies in the fact that the interna-
tional community would benefi t from jurisdictional certainty and predictability in 
cross-border activities and transnational commercial contracts. 
This has been underlined in a 2003 survey presented by the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) to government offi cials drafting the proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction. The survey revealed that businesses are faced with 
jurisdictional uncertainty in international contractual relations, which has in some 
cases even affected signifi cant business decisions.101 The regulation of jurisdiction 
in transnational commercial disputes between private entities carrying out activities 
across national borders requires a uniform and international approach, transcend-
ing national rules (and interests), if one wants to promote certainty, predictability 
and justice for international trade.102 In view of these objectives of unifi cation of 
international jurisdiction rules, a simple convention guaranteeing mutual recogni-
tion and enforcement on a world-wide scale will not eradicate the ‘jurisdictional 
web’ of rules in international litigation, and the ‘anarchy’103 of national jurisdiction 
rules will persist.104
The uncertainty, as a result of the lack of a set of unifi ed national jurisdiction 
rules, also results in either positive or negative jurisdiction confl icts. Positive juris-
diction confl icts occur when several courts claim jurisdiction over the dispute by 
virtue of their national jurisdiction rules, resulting in multiple competent forums 
and consequently leading to forum shopping. The number of available courts in-
creases especially when jurisdiction is asserted over a dispute on the basis of an 
exceedingly weak connection with the forum. Negative confl icts of jurisdiction 
arise when no forum, according to its national jurisdiction rules, confers jurisdic-
tion over a dispute, leaving parties empty handed and with no available court to 
100 Only then would ‘the vast amount of energy which is required to carry through any project for 
the unifi cation of law’ be justifi ed according to Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 27. But see in 
contrast Mayer in Proceedings of a Round Table, at 94, disagreeing with promoting international trade 
as the ‘offi cial aim’ for unifi cation.
101 See the news archives of the ICC at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/iccef/index.html, Paris, 
2 April 2003, ‘Jurisdictional certainty is essential in international contracts’; and Paris, 29 August 
2003, ‘Business hails Hague jurisdictional treaty draft’, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/
law/icced/index.html.
102 The following statement also applies to unifi cation of jurisdiction rules: ‘the advantage of uni-
fi ed law is that it makes international legal business easier’ and ‘reduces the legal risks … and hereby 
gives relief both to the businessman who plans the venture and to the judge who has to resolve the dis-
putes to which it gives rise. Thus unifi ed law promotes greater legal predictably and security.’ Zweigert 
and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 25.
103 C. McLachlan, ‘Interim Report Declining & Referring Jurisdiction in International Litigation’, 
presented at the International Law Association, London Conference, 2000, at 4.
104 However it should be noted that indirect jurisdiction rules as a requirement for international 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements, like those embodied in the fi rst Protocol of The 
Hague Convention on Recognition of 1971, have a potential harmonising effect on direct jurisdiction 
rules, as they exclude recognition when the judgement is founded on exorbitant jurisdiction rules.
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resort to. Such a ‘jurisdictional vacuum’105 often results in a ‘déni de justice’.106 
Regulating jurisdiction confl icts by mechanisms of lis pendens on the one hand, 
and the forum necessitatis rule on the other, will however not be suffi cient to deal 
with jurisdictional uncertainty when it comes to the question of ‘where to litigate’ 
in the fi rst place.107 
Jurisdictional certainty through unifi cation of international jurisdiction can be 
achieved by fi nding uniform jurisdiction rules suitable for international (contrac-
tual) disputes. This entails eliminating exorbitant jurisdiction rules, avoiding mul-
tiple forums and fi nding acceptable and feasible connecting factors for a uniform 
jurisdictional system. 
1.3.5 The Next Step: Progressive Unifi cation
It is generally believed that the more diffi cult the unifi cation is, the more valuable it 
gets, and the more ambitious the unifi cation project, the harder it becomes to reach 
consensus. In the fi eld of confl ict of law rules, unifi cation proceeded area-by-area: 
each convention carefully delimited its scope of application to specifi c rationae 
materiae; from the applicable law to specifi c contracts for the international sale 
of goods,108 to the law applicable to specifi c torts such as traffi c accidents.109 The 
same path should be followed for the unifi cation of international jurisdiction. This 
calls for rigorously delimiting the material scope and defi ning the subject matter 
autonomously in order to avoid problems of qualifi cation.110 Despite the HCCH’s 
statutory mission of ‘progressive unifi cation’,111 the Jurisdiction Project followed 
the Brussels Model, and aimed at unifying a wide range of jurisdiction rules in the 
fi eld of civil and commercial matters.112 It proved to be too ambitious and too dif-
fi cult. If one wants to achieve successful unifi cation, it is necessary to restore the 
progressive unifi cation approach.113 Future work of the HCCH in the fi eld of in-
ternational jurisdiction should be carried out area-by-area, beginning with disputes 
arising out of contractual relationships.114
105 Schulze, ‘The Leuven/London Principles’, at 161.
106 Either the court lacks jurisdiction because it does not have the legal basis to take jurisdiction, or 
the court has the competence but will not take the case because it has a discretionary power to refuse to 
do so. In those cases several systems apply the forum necessitatis rule. See in general F. Ibili, Gewogen 
rechtsmacht in het IPR: Over forum (non) conveniens en forum necessitatis (2007).
107 These mechanisms harmonise jurisdiction rules but do not provide for uniform jurisdiction 
rules, which is needed for jurisdictional certainty. But the ‘primary objective of harmonization is not 
uniformity’, see Glenn, ‘Unifi cation of Law’, at 783.
108 Hague Convention of 22 December 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods.
109 Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the Law Applicable to Traffi c Accidents.
110 Van Loon, ‘Quelques réfl exions’, at 1142.
111 See above Sect. 1.3.2.
112 See Pocar, Proceedings of a Round Table, at 75; and see Van Loon, ‘Globalisation and The 
Hague Conference’, at 231.
113 See the Minutes No. 1 Commission I General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, at 4, where 
Kovar states ‘that the [U.S.] Delegation believed the widely desired trade-off with “general doing 
business” jurisdiction on the black list was more concrete and easier to sell in the area of product li-
ability than when it applied to all civil and commercial litigation.’ See Chapter 7.
114 See also Brand, Proceedings of a Round Table, at 91: ‘[B]egin with the status quo in the multi-
lateral system (where the world stands now) and try to move step-by-step forward to a more coopera-
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1.4 Some Diffi culties Due to the Nature of Civil Jurisdiction
1.4.1 International Law and State Sovereignty 
International law does not impose restrictions on the reach of national jurisdiction 
rules.115 In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the pred-
ecessor of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ruled in its sole decision on 
jurisdiction that states can regulate jurisdiction as long as they do not interfere with 
the sovereignty of other states.116 Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, 
the Court argued that there is no ‘general prohibition to states to extend the ap-
plication of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and 
acts outside their territory.’117 However, the PCIJ continued ‘jurisdiction is strictly 
territorial’ in the sense that jurisdiction ‘cannot be exercised by a State outside 
its territory’.118 In other words, State A cannot impose on the courts of State B to 
take jurisdiction in an international dispute. Yet, both states are free to regulate the 
reach of the judicial powers of their judiciary with ‘a wide measure of discretion’ 
and ‘every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and 
most suitable’.119 This explains why judicial powers of some states have a wider 
reach than others. Only international conventions can limit this freedom. Alloca-
tion of international jurisdiction by the unifi cation of the rules means in practice 
that a state loses the freedom to decide in which cases it will take jurisdiction. By 
international agreement, the state will instead allow another state to have jurisdic-
tion over the dispute. Judicial adjudication and state sovereignty are closely linked. 
Therefore, the unifi cation of international jurisdiction rules is sometimes felt as an 
interference with state sovereignty and for that reason it remains a sensitive and 
political issue. 
tive, comprehensive approach. This approach would attempt to move private international law forward 
from where it is now, without necessarily saying “we have to go all the way”’.
115 Johnston and Powles, ‘The Kings of the World’, at 21 et seq.; Wautelet, ‘What Has Interna-
tional Private Law Achieved?’, at 59; H. Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht (2006), § 330, at 
121; J. Bertele, Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht: Ein untersuchung der aus dem Völkerrecht ableit-
baren Grenzen staatlicher extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion im Verfahrensrecht (1998), at 51-54; A. Neale 
and M. Stephens, International Business and National Jurisdiction (1998), at 18-19; F. Mann, ‘The 
Doctrine of International Jurisdiction’, 111 Recueil des cours (1964), 1-162, at 9; and see in general 
A. Strauss, ‘Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Juris-
diction in Domestic Courts’, 36 Harvard International Law Review (1995), 373-424; C. McLachlan, 
‘The Infl uence of International Law on Civil Jurisdiction’, in Hague Yearbook of International Law 
(1993), 125-144, J. Verheul, ‘The “forum actoris” and International Law’, in Essays on International 
& Comparative Law in Honour of Judge Erades (1983), 197-206; Miaja de la Muela, ‘Les principes 
directeurs’, at 27 et seq.; M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 46 British Yearbook of In-
ternational Law (1974), 145-257; and J. Stevenson, ‘The Relationship of Private International Law to 
Public International Law’, 52 Columbia Law Review (1952), 561-588. 
116 Please note however that the case dealt with criminal proceedings.
117 S.S. Lotus case, 7 September 1927, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, at 19.
118 Ibid., at 18-19.
119 Ibid., at 19. See also F. Marchadier, Les objectifs généraux du droit international privé à 
l’épreuve de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme (2007), at 226-227.
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1.4.2 Jurisdiction Rules, Connecting Factors and Territoriality
Although international law does not impose any particular restriction on the regu-
lation of jurisdiction,120 traditionally international jurisdiction is based on a par-
ticular connection with the forum.121 Apart from jurisdiction based on consent, 
most connecting factors are found in jurisdiction on the basis of a specifi c connec-
tion with the territory of the state122 and therefore the allocation of jurisdiction has 
long been indisputably linked with the principle of territoriality.123 Territoriality in 
the narrow sense of the word requires a ‘physical connection’ with the territory.124 
For the purpose of the present study, territoriality will be considered in its broadest 
sense: i.e. any connection between the territories of the forum can be jurisdiction-
creating, as long as it can be ‘localized’ or is ‘situated’ in that forum.
Today, the effects of globalisation, the world-wide web and e-commerce on 
transnational relationships challenge the foundation of jurisdiction based on tra-
ditional principles of territoriality which require a physical connection with the 
forum. Several scholars demand a different approach to jurisdiction, for instance 
abandoning the territoriality principle in its narrow sense.125 
1.4.3 Interaction with the Applicable Law
Ideally the competent court should be determined independently from the appli-
cable law. The civil law tradition generally applies a strict separation between the 
jurisdictional question and the question of applicable law.126 Contrastingly, other 
120 Except with respect to state immunity. 
121 Some countries use internal or territorial jurisdiction rules – allocating jurisdiction for national 
disputes within their territory – to determine whether their courts have international jurisdiction. This 
is also known as the ‘transposition’ of internal jurisdiction rules to international cases. See also Faw-
cett, Declining Jurisdiction, at 2. Other countries however have developed jurisdiction rules specifi -
cally designed for international disputes.
122 In some cases jurisdiction has been based on the ground of ‘personal connections’ with the 
forum. Nationality-based jurisdiction is the best illustration of this.
123 ‘Rien n’est plus territorial que de rendre la justice. C’est là que chaque Etat est le plus cha-
touilleux de son indépendance. La justice ne peut être rendue que sur le territoire même de l’Etat 
auquel appartient l’autorité judiciaire instituée’, J.-P. Niboyet, Cours de Droit International Privé 
Français (1949), at 436. See also A. Huet, ‘Compétence des Tribunaux français à l’égard des litiges in-
ternationaux’, Fascicule 581-10-51 Juris-Classeur Droit International (2002), at 13; and R. Michaels, 
‘Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality’, in Globalisation and Jurisdiction (2004), 106-130, at 128; 
Glenn, ‘Unifi cation of Law’, at 162.
124 Such as the U.S. territorialist theory of the Pennoyer Regime. See for more details, Chapter 5 
which is dedicated to the situation in the U.S.
125 See in general M. Berliri, ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet, and European Regulation 44 of 
2001’, in E-commerce: law and jurisdiction (2003), 1-13 and R. Freer, ‘American and European Ap-
proaches to Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Internet Activity’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1004887 (2007); but see Michaels, ‘Territorial Jurisdiction’, at 121 and 127 on ‘re-
territorialization’ of jurisdiction law; and Johnston and Powles, ‘The Kings of the World’, at 13 et seq.
126 This is the classic concept of separation of the two questions or ‘Eigenständigkeit der Zustän-
digkeitsregelung’ and contrasts with the Gleichlauf principle. H. Batiffol, ‘Observations sur les liens 
entre la compétence judiciaire et la compétence législative’, in De confl ictu legum (1962), 55-66; 
Miaja de la Muela, ‘Les principes directeurs’, at 24-25 and 60; Von Mehren, ‘Theory and Practice’, at 
36 and 157; and for general works, A. Heldrich, Internationale Zuständigkeit und anwendbares Recht 
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legal systems favour the lex fori rule, in which case the jurisdictional question is 
inseparably mingled with the applicable law question, and asserting jurisdiction to 
a particular forum automatically means applying the law of the court to the dispute. 
Several examples show that questions of applicable law sometimes interfere with 
the jurisdictional question and that in order to determine the competent court the 
applicable law to the dispute becomes relevant. Under English common law, for 
instance, the English courts are, under specifi c circumstances, competent when 
English law governs the contract.127 In Europe, the court of the place of perform-
ance is competent to hear disputes related to contractual matters, but courts often 
need to turn to the applicable law to the contract (lex causae) in order to determine 
the place of performance.128 
Some of the same connecting factors for jurisdiction are also to be found in con-
fl ict rules. However, two fundamental differences between the nature of confl ict of 
law rules and jurisdiction rules should be underlined. First, with respect to inter-
national jurisdiction it is possible to have multiple competent forums to rule over 
an international dispute, but only one substantive (national) law can apply to it.129 
Moreover, and setting aside uniform rules of allocation of jurisdiction, national ju-
risdiction rules are unilateral, as they are unable to allocate jurisdiction to a foreign 
court, as opposed to confl icts of laws rules which are generally multilateral and can 
determine the application of foreign law.130
In this context, it is worth mentioning that the civil law tradition generally ap-
plies the principle of jura novit curia; the court is supposed to know the law, in-
cluding foreign law. As a consequence, the court seized is expected to examine, 
investigate and apply foreign law when raised by a party and sometimes at its own 
motion.131 This stands in contrast to the common law tradition where courts have 
a more passive role towards the application of foreign substantive law. The status 
of foreign law is considered a fact to be raised, pleaded and proved by the parties 
during proceedings.132 In a world-wide context, the relevance of international ju-
risdiction varies as to the different attitudes towards the application of confl ict of 
law rules.133
(1969) and P. Mayer, ‘Droit international privé et le droit international public sous l’angle de la notion 
de la compétence’, 68 Revue critique de droit international privé (1979), 1 et seq., at 349 et seq., at 
537 et seq.
127 Rule 6.20(5)(c) CPR. This is also called forum legis. See Chapter 4 of this book. 
128 See Art. 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation.
129 P. Lagarde, ‘Le principe de proximité dans le droit internationale privé contemporain. Cours 
général de droit international privé’, 196 Recueil des cours (1986), 9-238, at 129-130; and Lowenfeld, 
The Quest for Reasonableness, at 3.
130 See also Lagarde, ‘Le principe de proximité’, at 130.
131 According to J. Mance, ‘The Future of Private International Law’, 1 Journal of Private In-
ternational Law (2005), 185-195, at 191: ‘Common law courts expect parties to plead and by expert 
evidence prove foreign law. German courts tend to look to academics and institutes, such as the Max 
Planck Institute for opinions on the relevant foreign law.’
132 See C. Pejovic, ‘Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal’, 
32(3) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (2001), 817-841, at 831, when foreign law is not 
proven, then the lex fori is the default applicable law.
133 Some scholars have identifi ed a general ‘homeward trend’ in the determination of the appli-
cable law, arguing that the lex fori is more often applied. The result is that ‘the designation of the 
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1.5 Problem Statement and Objective
At present, the road to international court litigation remains a very uncertain one. 
Apart from regional unifi cation and unifi cation in specifi c areas, the current state 
of affairs of jurisdiction rules in international court litigation is characterized by its 
complexity and does not provide legal certainty, predictability and justice which 
are needed by the international community in this dynamic world. Although parties 
can either choose a specifi c court or an arbitral tribunal to settle their dispute, there 
are still many cases where litigators will be left in the hands of ordinary jurisdic-
tion rules.134 There is an evident necessity for uniform rules governing issues of 
international jurisdiction in international disputes in general and in cross-border 
commercial contract disputes in particular. 
The objective of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the dif-
ferent approaches to international jurisdiction and its aim is to explore the pos-
sibilities of reconciling these differences in order to come to common grounds of 
jurisdiction in international commercial litigation. More specifi cally, by building 
a bridge of mutual understanding between common law and civil law traditions 
by way of analysing existing jurisdiction rules emanating from these traditions, 
this study will examine to what extent acceptable uniform jurisdiction rules can be 
found for disputes arising out of cross-border commercial contracts.
1.6 Scope
This study will focus on all jurisdiction rules to which parties, individuals and 
corporate entities, involved in disputes arising out of regular commercial contrac-
tual relationships can be subjected, for which purpose each jurisdictional provi-
sion asserting jurisdiction over disputes arising out of a contract will be studied. 
Furthermore, it involves examining rules of general jurisdiction designed to estab-
lish jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the claim; rules of special jurisdiction 
primarily designed for jurisdiction over contractual matters, as well as provisions 
establishing jurisdiction on the basis of commercial activities carried out by indi-
vidual and corporate defendants. The complexity of corporate entities and large 
economic operators requires detailed study of international jurisdiction over corpo-
rations. However, this study is not limited to business-to-business (B2B) contracts 
and will include claims involving natural persons carrying out business activities 
and concluding commercial contracts, as long as they are not consumers.135 
The scope of this study is limited to ‘regular’ or ‘general’ commercial contracts. 
Specifi c or ‘protected’ contracts, such as consumer, employment and insurance 
applicable law is now coming to depend on jurisdictional standards’. See for example, Th. de Boer, 
‘Forum Preferences in Contemporary European Confl icts Law: The Myth of a “Neutral Choice’’’, in 
Festschrift für Erik Jayme (2004), 39-55, at 47 and 51.
134 Either because the parties have not agreed on a dispute resolution clause, or when one of the 
parties successfully invokes the invalidity of a dispute resolution clause. Many arbitral and court pro-
ceedings involve the preliminary question on the validity of the dispute settlement clause.
135 See below. Jurisdiction rules in consumer contracts fall outside the scope of the present study, 
but see for an exhaustive overview J. Hill, Cross-border consumer contracts (2008).
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contracts will not be covered and given the specifi c legal problems and jurisdic-
tional implications arising out of e-commerce, international jurisdiction over dis-
putes arising out of e-contracts will also not be discussed in the present study. 
Excluded are also (contractual) claims concerning infringements of intellectual 
property rights,136 admiralty or maritime matters, insolvency and related matters, 
(contractual) rights in rem in immoveable property and tenancies of immoveable 
property, the carriage of passengers and goods137 and family matters.138
Since this study is limited to claims originating out of a contractual relationship 
between the parties, it excludes any dispute arising out of tortuous acts, whether 
they involve product liability, personal injury tort or environmental torts or claims 
based on human rights violation.139 For the same reason, (anti-) trust claims and 
claims for damages based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings will be 
excluded.
Any jurisdiction based on consent or prorogation of jurisdiction by way of a 
choice of court agreement included in international contracts is left outside the 
scope of this study since this is covered by The Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. Finally, and, notwithstanding their practical importance, the 
same goes for provisional and protective measures. Although jurisdiction rules of 
a more procedural nature such as jurisdiction over third parties, multiple defend-
ants – or class actions, related actions, counter-claims and lis pendens also affect 
the exercise of jurisdiction over contractual claims, they will not be considered as 
such. Nor will jurisdiction arising out of necessity, the forum necessitatis, be dealt 
with either. 
The question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements around 
the world is indisputably linked to the jurisdictional question, but is not the main 
concern of this study. As this book is principally limited to examining direct juris-
diction rules, it excludes issues of recognition and enforcement and indirect juris-
diction rules as requirements for the recognition of judgements.140
136 This includes the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights.
137 This study will exclude any specialized conventions dealing with areas relating to international 
carriage, transport and maritime matters, such as the Rhine Navigation Convention of 17 October 
1868; the Warsaw Convention 1929 for the Unifi cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air and protocols; the Brussels Convention 1952 on Certain Rules concerning Civil Jurisdic-
tion in Matters of Collision; the Brussels Convention 1952 on Certain Rules relating to the Arrest of 
Sea-going Ships; the Geneva 1956 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods 
by Road (CMR Convention); the International Convention 1969 on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage and protocols; the Bern Convention 1980 Concerning International Transport by Rail and 
protocols; the Montreal 1999 Convention for the Unifi cation of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air; the Geneva 1999 International Convention on Arrest of Ships; the Hamburg Rules 1978 
and the Rotterdam Rules 2009.
138 By analogy of the scope of the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreement and the 
Brussels Regulation, this includes the status and legal capacity of natural persons; maintenance obliga-
tions; other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or obligations 
arising out of marriage or similar relationships; and wills and succession.
139 See in this respect the ECJ’s Lechouritou decision of 15 February 2007, C-292/05 ECR I-1519.
140 Also discussed above in Sect. 1.3.4.
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Narrowing down the present study to confl icts arising out of contractual disputes 
is fi rst of all justifi ed by the fact that there are an extensive number of cases dealing 
with jurisdiction over claims relating to contractual matters. This not only indicates 
the need for uniform jurisdiction rules in contractual disputes, but also the lack of 
legal certainty and predictability in international commercial disputes.141 Second, 
as explained above, the work of the HCCH should be continued with a step-by-step 
approach. Progressive unifi cation starting with claims arising out of contracts will 
have more chances of success, as contractual disputes are closest to the freedom of 
contract and the self-determination of parties’ contractual rights. Contractual par-
ties are ‘linked by a voluntary bond’.142
1.7 The Comparative Approach
‘Unifi cation of law cannot be achieved by simply conjuring up an ideal law on any 
topic and hoping to have it adopted. One must fi rst fi nd what is common to the juris-
dictions concerned and incorporate that in the uniform law. Where there are areas of 
difference, one must reconcile them either by adopting the best existing variant or by 
fi nding, through comparative methods, a new solution which is better and more easily 
applied than any of the existing ones.’143
The chosen approach for the present study is the comparative approach.144 Tra-
ditionally, the ‘universal legal science’145 of comparative law is a valuable in-
strument in private international law.146 On numerous occasions, the negotiators 
at The Hague Conference have expressed the need for a comparative study to 
141 See Sect. 1.3.4 and see M. Keyes, Jurisdiction in International Litigation (2005), at 159.
142 See also U. Magnus and P. Mankowski, eds., Brussels I Regulation (2007), § 23, at 100, and § 
27, at 101: ‘Consensual transactions are contracts. Obligations voluntarily assumed by agreements are 
contractual by their nature.’
143 Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 24.
144 Ibid., at 2: ‘Comparative law is the comparison of different legal systems of the world’ with 
an extra dimension of internationalism. This study will therefore not take the approach of legal the-
ory analyzing the role of the Sovereign State with respect to international jurisdiction. For an exten-
sive study in this fi eld see the works of Bertele, Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht, specifi cally at 
112-193; T. Pfeiffer, Internationale Zuständigkeit und prozessuale Gerechtigkeit: Die internationale 
Zuständigkeit im Zivilprozess zwischen effektivem Rechtsschutz und nationaler Zuständigkeitspolitik 
(1995); J. Schröder, Internationale Zuständigkeit: Entwurf eines Systems von Zuständigkeitsinteres-
sen im zwischenstaatlichen Privatverfahrensrecht, aufgrund rechtshistorischer, rechtsvergleichender 
und rechtspolitischer Betrachtungen (1971); J. Hudault, ‘Sens et Portée de la compétence du juge 
naturel dans l’ancien droit français’, 61 Revue critique de droit international privé (1972), 27-54 and 
249-268; P. Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrecht (1976), in particular at 418; Ph. 
Thery, Pouvoir juridictionnel et compétence (1981); De Vareilles-Sommières, La compétence interna-
tionale de l’état; E. Pataut, Principe de souveraineté et confl it de juridictions (1999); and R. Michaels, 
‘Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge of Euro-
peanization and Globalization’, 74 Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper (2005), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228. See also the observations of Von Mehren, ‘Theory and Practice’, at 
150-154.
145 Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 46.
146 Ibid., at 6; Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Comparative Law and Confl ict of Laws: Allies or Enemies?’, at 
409; and Miaja de la Muela, ‘Les principes directeurs’, at 12.
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come to a better understanding of each other’s jurisdictional systems.147 Such a 
comparative ‘education’ is needed in order to overcome ‘impatience’, scepticism, 
legal pessimism or the so-called ‘realism’.148 Comparative law contributes to the 
(systematic) unifi cation of law.149 Although, it has been argued that comparative 
law and confl ict of laws have different objectives, since comparative law seeks 
international unifi cation and confl ict of law rules seeks to ‘coordinate’ different 
substantive laws,150 the opposite is true with respect to the ‘jurisdictional pillar’ 
of private international law. Especially because the objective is to fi nd common 
grounds, comparative law is certainly not an ‘enemy’, but an ally in the unifi ca-
tion process.151 The ability of comparatists to ‘[free] legal thought from inhibiting 
conceptual constraints by paving the way to new ways of reading the law’152 is 
crucial in such a process.153
Due to the complexity of sources of jurisdiction rules, a rule-based comparison 
will be carried out at three levels, namely at the national, regional and interna-
tional level. At the national level, jurisdiction rules of the following individual 
countries will be analysed. France has been chosen not only because it is generally 
considered to be the ‘parent system’ of the Romanistic Systems in Continental Eu-
rope, but also because it uses the highly controversial nationality-based jurisdiction 
rules.154 The German jurisdictional regime is indispensable, not only as the ‘parent 
system’ of the Germanic legal family, but also for its particular ‘property-based’ 
jurisdiction. The particularities and originality of the Swiss jurisdictional system 
justify a brief examination of this so-called ‘affi liated’ legal system of the Ger-
manic family.155 Although, the 2001 reform of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure 
also partially followed the jurisdictional scheme of the Brussels Model, the Dutch 
system has retained some features typical of the assertion of jurisdiction to courts 
in The Netherlands.156 
The common law tradition will be represented by England and the U.S.157 The 
selection of these national systems is justifi ed by the fact that they represent the 
147 Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention, at 70, referring to a mutual comparative edu-
cation for the successful conclusion of the proposed Convention.
148 Reimann, ‘Parochialism’, fn. 66, at 385.
149 Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 16.
150 Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Comparative Law and Confl ict of Laws: Allies or Enemies?’, at 407. See 
also A. von Mehren, ‘The Role of Comparative Law in Practice of International Law’, in Festchrift für 
Karl Neumayer zum 65. Geburtstag (1985), 479-486, at 483.
151 The title of the article by Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Comparative Law and Confl ict of Laws: Allies 
or Enemies?’, makes a reference to this.
152 Muir Watt, ‘La fonction subversive’, at 504 (English summary). 
153 See also Von Mehren, ‘The Role of Comparative Law’, at 486; Zweigert and Kötz, Compara-
tive Law, at 16.
154 Other systems traditionally belonging to the ‘Romanistic’ legal system, such as those of Italy 
and Spain, will be examined to illustrate the impact of the Brussels Model on national jurisdiction 
systems.
155 Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 41. 
156 The Dutch jurisdictional system is both of Germanic and Romanistic origin.
157 Australian jurisdiction law will be, where relevant, considered as a variation on the traditional 
English common law system. 
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two main legal traditions, the common law and the civil law tradition.158 These two 
legal traditions are at the origin of many other jurisdictional regimes around the 
world.159 
The regional unifi cation in Europe will be discussed in an exhaustive study of 
the Brussels Regulation. As far as relevant, the uniform jurisdiction derived from 
the regional organizations in Latin America will also be taken into account, but 
will not be dealt with separately.160 Finally, at the international level the efforts of 
unifi cation within the HCCH, the ILA and the IDI will also be examined.
1.8 Outline
This book could be divided in two parts: namely, the fi rst part provides a suc-
cessive, rather than a ‘simultaneous’, description of the selected jurisdictional 
regimes,161 the second part deals with the comparison, analysis, explanation and 
assessment of the jurisdictional regimes.
In Chapter 2 the uniform jurisdiction rules as found in the Brussels Regulation 
No. 44/2001 representing the regional unifi cation in Europe are outlined and this 
is followed by a description of national jurisdiction rules. Chapter 3 sets out with 
national reports describing the civil law tradition in France, Germany, Switzerland, 
and The Netherlands. The traditional English common law rules on jurisdiction are 
explained in Chapter 4, followed by the regulation of international jurisdiction in 
the United States of America in Chapter 5. In order to get a proper understanding 
of the diversity of U.S. jurisdiction law, the states of California, Florida, Michigan 
and New York have been selected as illustrations.162
The analysis commences in the second part with Chapter 6, in which the fun-
damental differences and contrasting approaches to international jurisdiction are 
analysed and explained. This chapter also develops parameters and assessment 
criteria that uniform rules should meet. Chapter 7 provides a detailed comparison 
of individual jurisdiction rules and connecting factors as encountered in the juris-
dictional systems surveyed in the fi rst part. Chapter 8 compares the discretionary 
powers and correction devices found in some legal systems. The comparison car-
ried out in Chapters 7 and 8 will also consider, where relevant, the provisions of 
the Drafts of The Hague Convention on Judgements and the recommendations of 
the ILA and the IDI. Additionally, on the basis of the parameters and assessment 
criteria developed in Chapter 6, jurisdiction rules and correction devices are evalu-
ated in order to fi nd common grounds for uniform rules. The fi nal chapter, Chapter 
9, draws conclusions and suggests uniform jurisdiction rules for international com-
mercial disputes.
158 Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 41; and Kokkini-Iatridou, Inleiding tot het rechts-
vergelĳkende onderzoek, at 137.
159 This includes the mixed regimes of Quebec, Japan, China and Israel.
160 Any uniform jurisdiction rules elaborated within MERCOSUR will be dealt with in Chapter 7, 
see the outline in Sect. 1.8.
161 See Zweigert and Kötz, Comparative Law, at 43.
162 See Chapter 5 for the selection criteria.
